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STURGEON v. FROST: A LIMITED HOLDING 
REVEALS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY 
HESITANT POST-SCALIA COURT 
MICHAEL O’LOUGHLIN* 
Abstract: The first environmental case before the United States Supreme Court 
after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, Sturgeon v. Frost, involved the Nation-
al Park Service’s authority to regulate hovercraft use over a segment of river 
running through lands under its authority pursuant to the Alaska National Inter-
est Lands Conservation Act. The plaintiff sought to show that the State held title 
to navigable waters within the State, and that, therefore, the National Park Ser-
vice did not have authority to enforce its regulation. The parties invoked prece-
dent and argued for textual analysis of the at-issue statute, but the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit forged its own interpretation of the stat-
ute to find for the National Park Service. On review, the United States Supreme 
Court invalidated the Ninth Circuit’s holding as incongruous with the context of 
the statute. However, despite a sufficient record, the Court did not articulate the 
correct interpretation, suggesting a Court hesitant to risk plurality.  
INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is a unique place.1 It houses more than half of the United 
States’ national parks, the tallest mountain on the continent, and an abun-
dance of natural resources.2 The state’s extensive land mass, unique re-
sources, traditional population, and odd dispersal of federal, state, private, 
and Native Corporation managed lands invite unique legislation.3 One such 
piece of legislation stood at issue in Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II), in 
which an Alaskan moose hunter sued the National Park Service (“NPS”) to 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 See Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II), 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070–71 (2016). 
 2 Deborah Williams, ANILCA: A Different Legal Framework for Managing the Extraordinary 
National Park Units of the Last Frontier, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 859, 859 (1997) (published in a 
symposium issue on the National Park System). 
 3 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066. The fact that Alaska is noncontiguous to the other states 
adds further constitutional questions to federal regulation, particularly to regulations passed under 
the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 3; Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 706–07 
(9th Cir. 1995) (Hall, J., dissenting); infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. The phrase “Na-
tive Corporations” refers to legal property owning entities comprised of native Alaskans estab-
lished after the dissolution of the aboriginal land claims in 1971. See infra note 54 and accompa-
nying text. 
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avoid future prosecution under a national regulation banning the use of 
hovercrafts over certain waters.4 
Rather than challenge the regulation or the Secretary of the Interior’s 
authority to promulgate it, the hunter challenged the NPS’s authority over 
what he claimed were state lands within a federal conservation system unit 
managed by the NPS.5 This focused the case on interpreting the legislation 
that created the conservation lands in Alaska and authorized the NPS to 
regulate them.6 Generally, courts feel comfortable interpreting statutes, and 
they have adopted an increasingly systematic approach to the process.7 Tex-
tualism in particular, as championed by the late-Justice Antonin Scalia fol-
lowing his appointment to the United States Supreme Court in 1986, has 
given courts a structured mechanism for interpreting statutes.8 Usually, 
when confronted with an issue of statutory interpretation, a reviewing court 
will first analyze the individual statutory terms at issue, expand the analysis 
to the surrounding text, then to the legislation as a whole, and finally look to 
legislative history as necessary.9 
In Sturgeon II, argued shortly before and decided shortly after Justice 
Scalia’s passing, the United States Supreme Court took a different ap-
proach.10 The Court’s decision barely addressed the statute’s text and did not 
approach the legislative history.11 Instead, the context created by Alaska’s 
                                                                                                                           
 4 136 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 5 Id. at 1068. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See infra notes 8–9. 
 8 See Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, United States Supreme Court, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
Address at Princeton University (March 8–9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VAL-
UES 100 (1995), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/scalia97.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RZ8K-JSSR]; see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–96 (2015) (systematically inter-
preting the Affordable Care Act); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388–91 
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating for focus on statutory text by repeating the phrase “[i]t 
is perfectly obvious on the face of this statute”); Biography of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographyScalia.aspx [https://perma.cc/N22P-M7UN]. 
 9 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–96 (starting with a textual analysis and then expanding to leg-
islative intent); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89–91 (2007) (starting 
with textual analysis and then expanding to legislative intent); see also Zuni, 550 U.S. at 106 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (suggesting that to resort to legislative history would help elucidate Con-
gress’s intent). 
 10 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1061; infra notes 72–84 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia 
passed away on February 13, 2016. Biography of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 8. 
 11 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070–71. Congress plainly acknowledged the value of Alas-
ka’s natural resources in its statement of purpose for the at-issue statute. See Alaska National In-
terest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (2012) (“In order to preserve . . . certain lands 
and waters in the State of Alaska that contain nationally significant natural, scenic, historic, arche-
ological, geological, scientific, wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values . . . .”). 
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distinct history and natural features controlled the reasoning of the Court.12 
This approach allowed the Court to produce a holding so limited in scope that 
it secured unanimous support from the Court’s eight remaining justices, both 
liberal and conservative.13 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In September 2007 John Sturgeon, a moose hunter, stopped within the 
Yukon-Charley National Preserve (“Yukon-Charley”) to make repairs to his 
hovercraft along the banks of the Nation River.14 Sturgeon began hunting in 
an area beyond the Yukon-Charley decades earlier and purchased his hover-
craft—a fan driven vehicle—in 1990 to help reach the remote hunting 
ground.15 While on the bank, three NPS law enforcement employees ap-
proached him and told him that a federal regulation prohibited hovercraft 
use over that portion of the Nation River.16 Initially, he protested, arguing 
that the river was state land and outside their jurisdiction.17 He complied 
with the verbal warning, however, after contacting his lawyer via satellite 
phone.18 Sturgeon subsequently missed the next several hunting seasons in 
continued compliance.19 
Hoping to ward off future prosecution, he filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Alaska.20 Sturgeon sought relief in 
two forms.21 First, he sought a declaration from the court that the hovercraft 
ban on the Nation River violated § 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”); and second, he sought to enjoin fur-
ther enforcement of NPS regulations on navigable waters belonging to the 
State.22 Alaska intervened on his behalf, seeking similar relief against the 
NPS, in part based on injury allegedly caused by an NPS permitting pro-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (describing Alaska as “the exception, not the rule”). 
 13 See id. at 1071–72; Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 45, 
40, 98 (2008); Hannah Fairfield & Adam Liptak, A More Nuanced Breakdown of the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/upshot/a-
more-nuanced-breakdown-of-the-supreme-court.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/997M-BTTV]. 
 14 Sturgeon v. Masica (Sturgeon I), 768 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated sub nom. 
Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016). 
 15 Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II), 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1064 (2016); Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1070. 
 16 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066–67; see Aircraft and Air Delivery, 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e) (2016). 
 17 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 18 Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1070. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Sturegon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067; Complaint at 1, Sturgeon v. Masica, No. 3:11-cv-00183-
HRH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157078 (D. Alaska Oct. 30, 2013). 
 21 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 22 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (2012); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067; Complaint, supra note 20, at 
20. 
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gram that inhibited its ability to take genetic samples of salmon in the Ala-
gnak River.23 
Sturgeon argued that because the waters of the Nation River are navi-
gable, the river belongs to the State, and therefore is not public land and not 
part of the Yukon-Charley.24 He further asserted that, because the river is 
not part of the preserve, the NPS does not have authority to regulate it.25 
The NPS in response ceded that the river qualifies as navigable waters, but 
raised alternative arguments to justify its exertion of authority.26 First, it 
asserted that the Nation River is part of the Yukon-Charley because the re-
served waters rights doctrine gives the United States title over such appur-
tenant waters.27 Hence, the river qualifies as public lands over which it has 
authority to regulate.28 Second, the NPS argued that § 103(c) of ANILCA 
only prohibits enforcing regulations that are applicable solely to public 
lands on nonpublic lands in Alaska.29 The hovercraft ban lacks such a pub-
lic-only designation, so the NPS reasoned that it does not fall into the Alas-
ka-specific exception, and the agency retains authority to enforce the regu-
lation within the bounds of the conservation system unit.30 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the NPS, and Stur-
geon and Alaska appealed.31 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit decided that Alaska lacked standing to continue the suit, but 
on Sturgeon’s substantive claims found for the NPS.32 The court did not 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067 (describing Alaska’s intervention in the case); Sturgeon I, 
768 F.3d at 1069 (describing Alaska’s allegations that the scientific research and collecting permit 
required by the National Park Service (“NPS”) increased staff time and expenses and disrupted its 
sovereignty over state lands and waters). Alaska’s position here parrots its position in other 
ANILCA cases, claiming sovereignty over and opposing federal regulation of navigable waters 
within the state. See John v. United States (John II), 720 F.3d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 2013); John v. 
United States (John I), 247 F.3d 1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001); Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 701 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
 24 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1068–69. 
 25 Id. at 1069. The term public lands refers to lands owned by the federal government. See 
infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 26 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069; Answer at 4, Sturgeon v. Masica, No. 3:11-cv-00183-HRH 
(D. Alaska, Oct. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5888230; see also Brief for Respondents at 21, Sturgeon v. 
Frost, 136 S. Ct. 106 (2016) (No. 14-1209) (ceding the navigability of the Nation River). 
 27 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069; see infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reserved water rights doctrine). Appurtenant waters are those attached to notable bodies of water. 
Appurtenant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 28 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069. This argument stems from the holdings of earlier Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) cases considering whether certain naviga-
ble waters qualify as public lands and thus invoke ANILCA’s rural subsistence hunting and fish-
ing priority. See John II, 720 F.3d at 1245; John I, 247 F.3d at 1033; Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 704. 
 29 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1067. 
 32 Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1081. 
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base its judgment on either of the § 103(c) interpretations proposed by the 
NPS.33 Instead, the court utilized an alternate interpretation based on its 
own disjunctive reading of the statute.34 The court reasoned that § 103(c) 
did create an exception of sorts into which state lands within federal con-
servation system units could fall, but that this exception only protects non-
public lands from enforcement of NPS regulations meant specifically for 
public lands in Alaska.35  
The Ninth Circuit focused on the phrase “solely to public lands” when 
asserting its interpretation of the statute.36 Rather than reading it as refining 
the preceding clause—that only public lands are part of the conservation 
system units—the Ninth Circuit read the phrase as independent from the 
other clauses of the section and as unambiguously creating an exception for 
certain types of regulations.37 The court then relied on one particular cannon 
of statutory interpretation in reaching its decision: a court should accept 
unambiguous terms as conclusive.38 Even though the court deemed the text 
of § 103(c) unambiguous, it proceeded to look to legislative history for sup-
plementary validation, stopping shy of looking to case precedent for tertiary 
support.39 
Unlike the NPS’s alternative argument, this interpretation added the 
criteria that the federal regulation must specifically target Alaska.40 Under 
this reasoning, the hovercraft ban fell outside the exception because it was 
enforceable nationwide.41 As a result, the NPS could enforce the hovercraft 
ban throughout Alaskan conservation system units on both public and non-
public lands.42 Sturgeon subsequently petitioned for and was granted certio-
rari by the United States Supreme Court.43 Oral arguments took place on 
January 20, 2016, before all nine members of the Court.44 Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069; Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077–79. 
 34 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069–70; Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077; see infra notes 36–40 
and accompanying text. 
 35 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069–70; Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077. 
 36 See Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id.; see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (explaining that courts 
should accept the unambiguous terms of statutory text). 
 39 See Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077–78. 
 40 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069–70; Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077–78. 
 41 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1067. 
 44 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Sturgeon v. Frost 136 S. Ct. 106 (2016) (No. 14-1209). 
At oral argument, the Court did probe the issues that it opted not to decide in its opinion, including 
relevant statutory and regulatory texts, title to the Nation River, and the regulatory authority of the 
NPS. See id. Several members of the Court found it generally odd that NPS could regulate the 
entire Yukon-Charley preserve but not the river running through it. See id. For example, Justice 
Elena Kagan said, “it seems to me a very strange thing that Congress would have created Federal 
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passed away a few weeks later on February 13.45 On March 22, the remain-
ing eight members of the Court issued their decision.46 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
The issue at the heart of Sturgeon v. Frost, whether the National Park 
Service (“NPS”) has authority to enforce its hovercraft ban on the Nation 
River as it runs through the Yukon-Charley, involves interpretation of the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) § 103(c).47 
Sturgeon’s claims do not question the validity of the hovercraft ban or the 
Secretary of the Interior’s authority to promulgate that regulation.48 Beyond 
this case, courts have not yet interpreted this particular subsection of 
ANILCA, nor have they interpreted comparable language in parallel stat-
utes applicable to other states, leaving this question to the United States Su-
preme Court.49 
From the time the U.S. purchased Alaska in 1867 until considerations 
of statehood began in the 1950s, ninety-eight percent of the 365 million 
acre territory belonged to the federal government.50 In creating the State of 
Alaska, the 1958 Alaska Statehood Act resolved this issue by permitting 
Alaska to select 103 million acres of that federal land for state ownership.51 
Upon becoming a state, Alaska also gained ownership of all lands under 
navigable waters in accordance with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and 
the equal footing doctrine.52 Nevertheless, ongoing land disputes with Alas-
                                                                                                                           
lands in a Federal park land but said that the Federal Park Service can’t have anything to do with 
the rivers. The rivers are like an important part of the park, aren’t they?” Id. at 27. Several others 
focused their questions on the text and the exception it creates, “[L]et’s talk about your authority 
. . . . I just get to the first sentence. . . . If it’s not within the unit, it’s not within the basic authority 
of the Park Service to issue regulations, period.” Id. at 41–42. 
 45  Biography of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 8. 
 46 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 47 See Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II), 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (2016). 
 48 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e) (2016) (banning hovercrafts); see Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067; Com-
plaint, supra note 20, at 14–18. 
 49 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1068, 71. The acreage of the national park system in Alaska 
and the odd way in which it took shape set the Alaskan system apart in terms of management and 
jurisdiction from the relatively uniform park system across the rest of the nation. Williams, supra 
note 2, at 859–60. 
 50 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1064–65. The Supreme Court indicated that the unique historical 
conditions from which ANILCA emerged weigh heavily on its proper interpretation. Id. at 1064–
66, 1071; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2012). 
 51 Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 
1065; Sturgeon v. Masica (Sturgeon I), 768 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated sub nom. 
Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016). 
 52 See U.S. CONST. art. IV § 3, cl. 1; Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012); infra 
note 69 and accompanying text (describing the equal footing doctrine). Alaskan natural resource 
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kan Natives forced the land management system to evolve.53 The 1971 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished all aboriginal land 
claims, but it permitted the Alaskan Natives to organize into Native Corpo-
rations and then select and manage forty million acres of the remaining fed-
eral land through those corporations.54 This still left almost two hundred 
million acres under federal control.55 
Congress passed ANILCA in 1980 after an attempt by President Carter 
to designate fifty-six million acres of Alaskan federal land for preservation 
as national monuments.56 ANILCA rescinded President Carter’s designa-
tions and set aside 104 million acres for preservation purposes, placing the 
preserved lands into conservation system units defined along natural fea-
tures of the land.57 Because the conservation system units have natural rather 
than political boundaries, more than eighteen million acres of state, Native 
Corporation, and private lands fall within them, creating the subject of litiga-
tion in Sturgeon I and II.58 
As with most national preserves, ANILCA gives regulatory authority 
over the preserved lands to the NPS.59 But, unlike most resource-preservation 
statutes, it creates a management regime tailored to the particular physical 
and societal circumstances of the region.60 Foremost, it bars the NPS from 
prohibiting certain activities of particular importance to Alaskan culture, 
such as subsistence hunting.61 It also allows sport hunting on some preserve 
lands, and, in acknowledgment of the remote nature of much of the region, 
contains an entire title devoted to promoting access to the preserve sys-
tem.62 Section 103(c) further limits the NPS’s authority stating that only 
public lands are part of the conservation system units and that federal regu-
                                                                                                                           
policy aims to make these resources “available for maximum use consistent with the public inter-
est.” ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 53 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 54 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629(h) (2012); Sturgeon II, 136 
S. Ct. at 1065. 
 55 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1065. The remaining federal lands still exceed the total land area 
of the second largest state, Texas. See Gregory McNamee, DeWitt Redick, & Ralph Wooster, Texas, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 22, 2015), https://www.britannica.com/place/Texas-state 
[https://perma.cc/7ZK3-32PT]. 
 56 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2012); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066–67. 
 57 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066. 
 58 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066. 
 59 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3102–3103; Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 60 See 16 U.S.C. § 3101; Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066, 1070; Williams, supra note 2, at 
859–60. 
 61 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066; see 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c); Williams, supra note 2, at 860. 
 62 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3173 (2012); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1066; Williams, supra note 
2, at 860, 863. 
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lations are only applicable to public lands.63 In addition, § 103(c) provides 
for a means to convey nonpublic lands back to federal control.64 
B. Regulatory Authority over Navigable Waters 
Behind ANILCA, several constitutional doctrines of federalism govern 
state and federal authority over navigable waters.65 Most applicable to these 
facts are the equal footing doctrine and the reserved water rights doctrine.66 
The equal footing doctrine guarantees that states joining the union enter 
with the same rights as the original thirteen, which includes title to lands 
submerged under navigable bodies of water, such as the Nation River.67 The 
reserved water rights doctrine, contrarily, gives the federal government au-
thority to regulate waters proximate to but otherwise beyond its jurisdiction 
as the effective regulation of lands and waters within its jurisdiction makes 
necessary.68  
Other cases interpreting ANILCA have based their holdings on the juris-
dictional framework that these doctrines outline.69 Alaska v. Babbitt and its 
progeny, for example, each arose from tripartite conflict between the state, the 
federal government, and Native Alaskans over the subsistence fishing rights 
granted by ANILCA.70 In these cases, the state raised its jurisdictional control 
over submerged lands, but the court, acknowledging the reserved water rights 
doctrine, resolved the matter in favor of enforcing ANILCA.71 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Sturgeon v. Frost, the United States Supreme Court analyzed undis-
puted facts and four proposed interpretations of § 103(c) of the Alaska Na-
tional Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”).72 The Court’s holding, 
however, displays curious restraint.73 Ultimately, the holding reduces to a 
rather simple statement that neither addresses all of the proposed interpreta-
                                                                                                                           
 63 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). 
 64 See id. 
 65 Charles F. Wilkins, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and 
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 439 (1989). 
 66 See infra notes 104–117, and accompanying text. 
 67 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988); Equal Footing Doctrine, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 68 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 
 69 See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 70 John v. United States (John II), 720 F.3d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 2013); John v. United States 
(John I), 247 F.3d 1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001); Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 71 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1072; John II, 720 F.3d at 1226; John I, 247 F.3d at 1033; Bab-
bitt, 72 F.3d at 704. 
 72 See 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c); Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II), 136 S. Ct. at 1066, 67, 68–70. 
 73 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1072; see infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
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tions nor applies the facts.74 The Court reviewed the interpretation asserted 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in light of Alas-
ka’s unique land use regime and natural resources, declared it inconsistent 
with the text and context of the statute, and then declined to go further.75 
The Court did so despite having the resources necessary to declare the cor-
rect interpretation of § 103(c) and speak to the Nation River’s status as pub-
lic land.76 Interestingly, this display of judicial restraint may actually stem 
from considerations beyond mere respect for the lower courts, namely, the 
timing of the case and composition of the Court.77 
The Court unanimously saw the interpretation given by Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals as reaching absurd results when viewed in context ANIL-
CA’s enactment.78 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation drew a line between 
regulations written specifically for Alaska and those written for national 
application, allowing the National Park Service (“NPS”) to enforce those 
regulations not written specifically for Alaska in the same way as it would 
throughout the rest of its jurisdiction.79 In other words, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the NPS could not enforce Alaska-specific regulations on nonpub-
lic lands within the State but could enforce national regulations, such as the 
hovercraft ban, on those same lands.80 
Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that this limited and detracted recog-
nition of Alaska’s uniqueness falls short of what ANILCA requires.81 Viewing 
ANILCA as a collective act, understanding ANILCA as a descendant of the 
Alaska Statehood Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, and ap-
preciating that its drafters accounted for the abundance, uniqueness, and re-
moteness of the State’s natural resources; ANILCA reasonably creates a dis-
tinct preservation system.82 Section 103(c) further tries to distinguish the pub-
lic and nonpublic lands within the State.83 The Court recognized that the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation only allows the NPS to acknowledge the excep-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070. 
 75 See id. The opinion only discusses the text minimally. See id. at 1071. 
 76 See id. at 1067–69; see infra notes 86–120 and accompanying text. 
 77 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1061; Katherine Vaccaro, Split Supreme Court Raises EPA Regu-
lation Questions; Environmental Law, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 6, 2016), http://www.thelegal
intelligencer.com/id=1202761904433/Split-Supreme-Court-Raises-EPA-Regulation-Questions?sl
return=20160826114950 [https://perma.cc/4SSB-SHMY]; see infra notes 123–133 and accompa-
nying text. 
 78 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070. 
 79 Id. at 1069–70; Sturgeon v. Masica (Sturgeon I), 768 F.3d 1066, 1077–78 (2014), vacated 
sub nom. Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016). 
 80 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070; Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077. 
 81 Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070. 
 82 Id. at 1065–66; Williams, supra note 2, at 867. 
 83 See 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (2012); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1067–68. 
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tional character of Alaska through promulgation of Alaska-specific regula-
tions, not through tailoring its enforcement practices.84 
The Court was correct in invalidating the interpretation of § 103(c) put 
forth by the Ninth Circuit, but it could have issued a more comprehensive 
judgment.85 Foremost, it did not actually state a definitive interpretation of 
the statute.86 Further, to leave no confusion as to the extent of the holding, 
Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to limit it explicitly.87 He wrote that the 
Court did not decide whether the Nation River qualified as public land, and 
that it did not decide whether the NPS had authority to enforce its regula-
tions on the Nation River.88 Summarily speaking, the Court failed to decide 
any of the questions or address any of the proposed resolutions raised by the 
parties to the case.89 
The Court could have stated the correct interpretation of § 103(c).90 
Armed with the statutory text, references to legislative history on the rec-
ord, and even an understanding of the context surrounding ANICLA’s en-
actment, the Court had all of the information necessary to dictate the proper 
reading of the statute.91 The Court actually utilized most of these resources 
in reaching its limited holding, but it stopped short of giving comprehensive 
guidance on how to read the statute.92  
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1071. 
 85 See 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). Compare Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (expressly limiting its 
holding), with Util. Air Reg. Group v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (reaching 
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decision that discussed the Environmental Protection Agency’s scope of authority as it pertains to 
the Clean Air Act, discussed the applicability of that precedent, and then performed a largely tex-
tual statutory analysis to decide each issue before the Court. 134 S. Ct. at 2439–41, 2442–49; see 
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 498, 529 (2009) (determining that greenhouse 
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See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070–71; infra notes 90–120 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1071. 
 87 See id. at 1072. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 1071–72; Complaint, supra note 20, at 19–20; Answer, supra note 26, at 11; 
Brief for Respondents, supra note 26, at 2; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 3–64. 
In reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, Chief Justice Roberts relied on a single case as prece-
dent. Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070. He cited Roberts v. Sea-land Services, Inc., an employment 
case involving the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, to support the simple 
proposition that courts should consider context when interpreting statutes. Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1070 (quoting 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (“Statutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum”). 
 90 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c); see Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1071 (opting not to definitively interpret 
§ 103 of ANILCA); Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077–78 (opting to interpret § 103 of ANCILA). 
 91 See 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. 1070–71; Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077–78. 
 92 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1070–71. 
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Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’ manner of dismissing the lower 
court’s interpretation implies that he believes a particular interpretation is 
correct, specifically that § 103(c) makes nonpublic lands within Alaskan 
conservation system units an exception to NPS’s authority and that the aim 
and scope of the rulemaking does not limit this exception.93 The opinion 
highlights that ANILCA aims to treat conservation system units in Alaska 
differently than those elsewhere, that a further distinction lies between 
treatment of public and nonpublic lands within those units, and that limiting 
this differential treatment to those regulations purposed specifically for 
Alaska falls short of ANILCA’s demands.94  
Based on this view, an interpretation limiting the exception to those reg-
ulations expressly purposed for public lands, as advocated for by the NPS, 
would probably not fare much better than the reading of § 103(c) offered by 
the Ninth Circuit.95 Thus, the Court would probably favor the interpretation 
presented by the petitioner—that NPS cannot enforce its regulations on 
nonpublic lands—over that of the NPS.96 The Court, nevertheless, fails to 
say so explicitly.97 Instead, it avoids the declaration and shifts this responsi-
bility back to the Circuit Court.98 
The Supreme Court also could have considered whether the Nation 
River qualifies as public land which would have allowed it to apply the 
facts of the case to § 103.99 Because the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation made 
answering this question unnecessary, that court did not hold on the matter, 
and correspondingly the Supreme Court could avoid the issue.100 The par-
ties in their briefs, however, did raise the question, and, again, the Court had 
the necessary record and precedent at least to narrow the issue.101 
The facts acquiesced by both parties and case precedent suggest that 
the Court could have narrowed the questions on remand, first, to whether 
the Nation River qualifies as waters appurtenant to the public land within 
the Yukon-Charley and, second, whether its regulation is necessary to the 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c); Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1071. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See id.; Brief for Respondents, supra note 26, at 48. 
 96 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1071. 
 97 See id. 
 98 Id. at 1071–72. Rather than consider the parties’ arguments itself, the Court simply vacated 
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for the circuit court to reconsider the arguments. Id. at 
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 99 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1072. 
 100 See Sturgeon I, 768 F.3d at 1077–78; STEVEN CHILDRESS & MARTHA DAVIES, FEDERAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.03 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing the scope of appellate review). 
 101 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069; Brief for Petitioner at 35, Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 
106 (2016) (No. 14-1209); Brief for Respondents at, supra note 26, at 2, 25–26. 
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preservation efforts of the NPS for that land.102 Both parties ceded the navi-
gability of the Nation River.103 Sturgeon proposed that, in accordance with 
the equal footing doctrine and Submerged Lands Act, this made it property 
of the State.104 Under this theory, if the Nation River is navigable, title to its 
submerged lands passed to Alaska upon statehood.105 Applying the interpre-
tation of § 103(c) implied by the Court, such state lands qualify as nonpub-
lic lands and fall outside NPS authority.106 The NPS, though, proposed that, 
in that scenario, the reserved water rights doctrine pulls that section of the 
Nation River back into its jurisdiction.107 Based on this argument, if the dis-
puted section of river attaches to public lands under NPS authority and suc-
cessful preservation of the Yukon-Charley necessitates its regulation, then it 
becomes public land also under its authority.108 
The Court has well-established precedent to guide its review of both 
the equal footing doctrine and the reserved water rights doctrine.109 The 
Ninth Circuit has even utilized the reserved water doctrine to decide wheth-
er ANILCA applies to other segments of river.110 In Alaska v. Babbitt, Alas-
kan Natives and the State challenged regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of the Interior regarding the qualification of navigable waters as public 
lands for ANILCA’s subsistence fishing provision.111 The Natives maintained 
that ANILCA allowed subsistence fishing in all navigable waters because all 
navigable waters qualify as public lands.112 The State, on the other hand, in-
sisted that no navigable waters qualify as public lands.113 The federal agen-
cies, for their part, maintained that only those navigable waters brought un-
der its jurisdiction by the reserved water rights doctrine qualify as public.114 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See Sturgeon II, 136 S. Ct. at 1069; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 101, at 35; Brief for 
Respondents, supra note 26, at 2, 25–26. 
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1995). 
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In the end, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal agencies’ position 
represented the best interpretation.115 It has since upheld this interpretation 
in two subsequent cases.116 The position raised by the NPS in Sturgeon II 
stems directly from this line of precedent.117 
Unless the Supreme Court expected the Ninth Circuit to reverse its po-
sition on this point, it could have referred to this line of cases to find that 
the Nation River may qualify as public land and thus places the Yukon-
Charley within NPS authority.118 This position, coupled with an actual in-
terpretation of § 103(c), would have left concrete questions for review on 
remand.119 Instead, despite having the tools to shape a comprehensive hold-
ing, the Court in effect told the lower court to try again.120 A more thorough 
review of the statutory terms, the text surrounding § 103(c), and the statuto-
ry structure, would most likely have still invalidated the Ninth Circuit’s in-
terpretation.121 Had the Court explicitly adopted the interpretation that Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion seems to favor, however, it may have resulted in a 
plurality judgment, which would have left the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in-
tact—an option that the Court unanimously opposed.122 
While only the justices themselves could say with certainty, the timing 
of the oral arguments, Justice Scalia’s untimely death, and the Court’s deci-
sion lends some light to the impetus behind the narrow holding proffered by 
the Court.123 The even composition of the Court, split between liberal and 
conservative justices, at the time of the decision made a plurality a genuine 
possibility had the Court chosen to issue a broader opinion.124 Unfortunate-
ly, an eight-justice court lacks the capacity to absorb disharmony of a nine-
justice court.125 Since the last of the current members of the Court took their 
seats, the Court has decided several environmental cases of note, many of 
which have demonstrated a recognizable philosophical divide within the 
Court, particularly in cases involving the extent of regulatory authority.126 A 
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review of the Sturgeon II oral argument transcript shows similar disagree-
ment brewing between members of the Court in late January.127 
Some philosophical discord makes sense when one considers the pos-
sible implications of a more comprehensive holding.128 The massive acre-
age of preserve lands within Alaska means that the Court’s interpretation 
automatically influences a large swath of the National Park System, even 
though ANILCA only applies to a single state.129 Further, because the case 
involves the relationship between state and federal governments and a 
preservation system tailored to the unique character of the State, the deci-
sion could implicate both federalism and the future of adaptive land use 
management.130  
As the Court proceeds with eight members and an apparent ideological 
split, safe holdings such as the one demonstrated in Sturgeon II may occur 
with greater frequency.131 Correspondingly, potentially landscape-shifting 
pronouncements may stall, particularly in divisive fields such as many of 
the areas lumped under the title of environmental law.132 With the future 
composition of the Court uncertain and the sitting Court apparently hesitant 
to extend its holdings to the point of plurality division, the future of envi-
ronmental law hangs in limbo.133 
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CONCLUSION 
The first environmental decision following the passing of Justice Scal-
ia, Sturgeon v. Frost, presented the United States Supreme Court with an 
interesting fact pattern involving hovercraft use in the remote expanses of 
Alaska, and an issue of state/federal relations that it could resolve through 
simple statutory interpretation. While the piece of legislation in question, 
§ 103(c) of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), 
applies to a single state, the expanse of preserved lands governed by that 
statute means that any relevant decision would affect a significant portion of 
the United States’ protected lands. 
With undisputed facts and several proposed interpretations before it, 
the Court had the option to stabilize regulatory authority over that region. 
But, it chose not to. Instead, it chose to limit its holding, invalidate the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
statute as disagreeing with the unique history and natural resources of the 
State as recognized by ANILCA, and shift the burden of statutory interpre-
tation back to the lower court. Whether the political makeup of an eight-
person court and a potential split decision or the plain proximity to Justice 
Scalia’s passing affected the decision will remain a mystery. If this apparent 
hesitancy to issue full decisions on potentially divisive matters continues, 
however, the progress of environmental law will wait in the unknown until 
the stability of the political branches improves. 
  
 
